No reader of newspapers need be told that the recent past has been eventful from a labor relations point of view in the air transport industry, and many travelers by air can recount vivid personal experiences illustrative of travel problems and inconvenience caused by strikes on the airlines.-This article describes factors underlying these disturbances, outlines the applicable labor laws, and summarizes recent developments. First in order, however, is a brief description of those aspects of the air transport industry having a particular bearing on its labor relations:
increase was granted 11 and surcharges for jet service have been authorized 1 Despite constantly improving service and higher costs, the average fare paid by the passenger for air transportation has not increased in the postwar period-partly because of the introduction of coach service in 1948.3 In 1957 and 1958, the financial picture looked particularly bleak, and while the resul-ts for the end of 1958 and for 1959 have shown improvement, there is no clear indication that the airlines are out of the woods yet" 8 These financial pressures have resulted in part from the demands of employee groups. As shown in appendix A at the end of this article, the increases in average pay of mechanics during the past twelve years have substantially exceeded increases in the Consumer Price Index plus an annual productivity factor, and this has not been passed on to the consumer. Recent settlements have brought the pay level of mechanics even higher. Similarly, as a result of negotiations recently concluded, a senior pilot's compensation may run up to $33,000 per year, exclusive of substantial fringe benefits including, in some cases, more than two weeks' free time at home every month.' 4 These, then, are salient factors presently affecting the labor relations of the airlines. Having them in mind will make more meaningful some of the aspects of the Railway Labor Act discussed in the next section. No. E-13 3 9 5 , CAB, Jan. I6, 1959, and id., Order No. E-1 3 4 17, Jan. 22, 1959, in which the Board states that the extra charge is not for jet service as such, but for the "more deluxe type of service." " See note 6 supra. App. A contains an indication of the trend in revenue-mile yields since 1948. " In General Passenger Fare Investigation, No. 8oo8, Initial Decision, CAB, May 27, x959, pp. 167, 177, Examiner Ralph L. Wiser concluded that "the domestic trunkline air-transport industry failed to earz a fair return in 1957 and 1958 by any reasonable standard of consideration," and that "if' 1957 and x958, both yearly and 5-year averages of profits were well below a reasonable level." " See Sheehan, What's Eating the Airline Pilots?, Fortune, April 1959, pp. 122, 123. Historically, one reason for the high level of pilot compensation was the expectation that they would be compelled to retire at a comparatively early age. In PRESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY BOARD No. 36, REPORT i, 12 (1946) , for example, it is stated that "Expert evidence indicates that the active flying life of an air-line pilot may extend up to 5o years. . . . [While] flying careers may be longer than generally believed . . . the chance of continuing beyond 5o is doubtful." That emergency board proceeding ini volved problems in the transition from two to four-engine equipment in 1946. Before World War II, it was tliought that pilots would have to end active flying even sooner. That has not proved to be the case in practice. At present, there are a number of airline pilots over 6o; and, in fact, two adjustment bdards recently ruled that a carrier could not impose a compulsory retirement age of 6o on its pilots, An action for a declaratory judgment that such a ruling is erroneous and void has been commenced by' Western Air Lines against the Air Line Pilots Association 'in the United States District Court for the Soutiern District of California.
procedures for dealing with certain types of disputes were strengthened.lt The Act was made applicable to the airlines by the addition of title two in 193608 -There have been no statutory changes since then, other than an amendment in 1951 authorizing union-shop agreements and the check-off of union dues.' 9 B. Coverage The Act covers air and rail carriers in interstate commerce, 20 including stateowned railroads 21 and foreign carriers with employees based in the United States, 22 whether the services performed are directly connected with transportation or not 3 It does not cover employees based in foreign countries. 24 BOARD, 1934 BOARD, -1957 BOARD, , app. B (1958 (1956) , holds that the amendment is coistitutional and that it pre-empts state right-to-work laws. In International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, io8 S.E.2d 796 (Ga. I959), from which an appeal is pending to the United States Supreme Court, it was held that a union-shop agreement under the Railway Labor Act violated constitutional rights if the dues collected were used to foster programs and ideologies opposed by some of the employees.
§ (appeal pending) . For a summary of the NMB's views concerning jurisdictional problems,'see NMB REPORT 6-8.
" § 1, Fifth, 44 Stit. 577 (1926) , 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1952). In Case No. R-2107 (949), the NMB held that mechanical foremen are "employees" for the purposes of the -Act, but Case' -No. C-2783 (I959) Air and rail carriers may seek protection against secondary boycotts under section 8(b) (4) (A) of the National Labor Relations Act, 2 " but prior to the passage of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of I959,268 it was problematical whether relief would be afforded. 26 " One of the purposes of the new law is to make the secondary boycott prohibitions clearly applicable to such carriers and their employees.
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C. Representation
The Railway Labor Act protects employees in the selection of bargaining representatives; 28 and the National Mediation Board, charged with settling representation disputes, 29 interprets this protection as requiring it to promote the organization of employees. 0 One curious manifestation of this interpretation is that the NMB representation election ballots contain no space for a negative vote. 3 ' Consequently, employees not wishing union representation must either not vote or vote an invalid ballot by marking "No Union" on it0'
Before conducting an election, the NMB determines the system-wide "class or
indicates that such employees are not included within the scope of an airline mechanics certification. 
2'
Ibid. Since that section refers to a representation dispute "among a carrier's employees," the NMB takes the position that carriers may not institute or be a formal party in such proceedings, although it may "in its discretion hold a public hearing . . . at which the carrier concerned is usually invited to present factual information." NMB REPORT 4, 29. As a consequence, no means is afforded whereby the employer can directly challenge the majority status of a union seeking to bargain or protect itself against jurisdictional disputes. Under the amended National Labor Relations Act § 9(c), 61 Stat. 143 (1947) Once a bargaining agent has been designated by the Board (or recognized by the carrier without an election), disputes between the union and carrier fall into two categories, in the parlance which has developed under the Railway Labor Act. Controversies over rates of pay, rules, or working conditions in the negotiation of a new contract are referred to as "major" disputes; these are distinguished from "minor" disputes, which involve employee grievances or the interpretation or application of an effective agreement 3 7 Consistent with its primary purpose of "'avoid[ing] any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein" within the framework of collective bargaining," s the Act has elaborate machinery for the settlement of both types of disputes, as described in the next two sections.
D. Minor Disputes
Minor disputes usually are processed through three steps and then, if unresolved, are submitted to an adjustment board for a "final and binding" award. 3 9 The National Railroad Adjustment Board processes railroad minor disputes. It is a permanent body of thirty-six members divided into four divisions. The railroads and the unions "national in scope" each designate half of the members. Each division has jurisdiction over disputes involving specified categories of employees 4° Although title two of the Act authorizes a National Air Transport Adjustment Board for air carriers, 41 it has never been established. 4 2 Instead, it is customary for the air carriers' working agreements to provide for system boards of adjustment having a similar jurisdiction.
43 Such boards have representatives of both the carrier and union, but " 5 As one observer has said (in an unpublished speech), "The multiplicity of contracting parties in the airline industry has all the disadvantages but, so far as I can see, none of the attractiveness of a harem. There is constant turmoil not only between the airline and its polygamous flock but also between the jealous rivals themselves." the disputes usually are settled by a neutral referee who is either agreed to by the parties or selected by the NMB. Neutrals chosen for the adjustment boards of air carriers function much like regular labor arbitrators. The NRAB, however, since it is a continuing body, has developed characteristics of its own. 44
E. Major Disputes
As to major disputes, the parties first bargain without assistance following a thirty-day notice of opening on existing contracts. 4 If an impasse results, the NMB steps in, either on its own motion or at the request of either party. 40 Should agreement still not be reached, the Board proffers arbitration, 47 and if that is refused (as it usually is) ,48 as a last resort the Board may (but need not) recommend the appointment of a presidential emergency board. 49 The emergency board makes an investigation, perhaps attempting to mediate the dispute itself, and then reports to the President. The parties are required to maintain the status quo 0 until thirty days have elapsed after the emergency board's report, following which the union may strike and the carrier may change conditions of employment and presumably hire replacements. Theoretically, the carrier also could resort to a lockout at that time, but as a practical matter-aside from competitive considerations-this is not feasible because of its obligations under unexpired contracts with other unions.
Major dispute proceedings often consume a great deal of time. The recent controversy between six air carriers and the International Association of Machinists is a case in point. 1 The agreements with the IAM expired on October 1, 1957. Approximately thirty days prior thereto the unions and companies exchanged proposals and began negotiating. Negotiations having proved fruitless, the services of 44 Stat. 586 (1926) , 45 U.S.C. § x6o (1952), the NMB notifies the President only if the dispute, in its judgment, threatens "substantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country of essential transportation service," and the President then appoints the emergency board "in" his discretion." During and after the io8-day strike by the pilots against Western Air Lines in 1958, there was considerable criticism of the NMB's failure to recommend the appointment of an emergency board. 0 § 0, 44 Stat. 586 (1926) , 45-U.S.C. § 16o (952), provides that "no change, except by agreement, shall be made by the parties to -he controversy in the conditions out of which the dispute arose." Under § 5, 44 Stat. 580 (1926) , 45 U.S. C. § S55 (952), the parties may make "no change . . . in the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions or established practices in effect prior to the time the dispute arose" during mediation or for 30 days thereafter.
" The six airlines were Capital, Eastern, National, Northeast, Northwest, and Trans World.
the NMB were invoked, and continued for several months. The Mediation Board then proffered arbitration, which was refused, and on February 27, 1958, the President created Emergency Board Number 122 by executive order. That Board first met on March ii for organizational purposes. Hearings commenced April 15, 1958 and continued for a total of sixty days thereafter, closing on July 29, 1958. The Board (comprised of Howard A. Johnson, retired chief justice of the Supreme Court of Montana, as Chairman; Dr. Paul N. Guthrie, professor of labor economics at the University of North Carolina; and Francis J. Robertson, an attorney from Washington, D.C.) heard at length representatives of the parties and expert witnesses. Seven thousand, one hundred and sixty-two pages of testimony were taken, and approximately 970 exhibits, containing some 5,000 pages, were received in evidence. Following the hearings, the Board met with the parties informally in an unsuccessful attempt to bring about a settlement. It then produced a report and recommendations on September 15, 1958. That report contained iio printed pages.
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The union had sought more and the carriers, less, than the Emergency Board recommended. The carriers, nevertheless, announced that they would accept the recommendations, but the IAM said merely that it would consider them as a "basis for further negotiations."
53 Negotiations thereupon continued for thirty days, and a series of strikes followed. 54 The ultimate settlements were substantially in excess of the Emergency Board's recommendations. The question arises as to just what the President is supposed to do after receiving a report from an emergency board. When the Railway Labor Act was passed, a great deal of pious confidence in the salutary effect of public opinion was expressed. In fact, Donald Richberg, counsel to the railroad unions and chief draftsman of the Act, stated that because of public opinion, it would be difficult for the parties not to accept emergency board recommendations.
5
" In practice, however, such recommendations have not been the basis for settlement, but merely "a springboard from which [the unions] could obtain further concessions."
57 "For over a decade the significant collective bargaining developments have usually occurred after the report was issued and found unacceptable." ' 8
As the NMB observed in 1953:59
Means must be found to focus attention on the reports of Presidential emergency boards in such manner that they will afford the basis of settlements without further prolonged negotiations and threats of strike action, if not actual strikes. Otherwise, the role to be ;3 PRESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY BoARD No. 122, REPORT (1958) & North Western Ry. Co. v. Order of Railroad Telegraphers, 69 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit enjoined a strike over a carrier's "central agency plan," which resulted in the laying off of employees, on the ground that the union could not force the carrier to agree not to abolish positions without its consent. Like the "Toledo Yard" case discussed above, the Chicago & North Western case involves essentially a featherbedding situation ("many station agents were receiving a full day's pay for twelve to thirty minutes' work"). While proposals concerning stabilization of employment such as severance pay, supplemental unemployment compensation benefits, and guaranteed employment might be legitimate objectives of collective bargaining, the court distinguished them from the situation before it as not vesting "indefinite retroactive veto power over abolition of positions [but] are expressly limited to prospective periods of short duration." The court went on to say: 7°I t appears clear that the effect of the Union's proposal, if accepted, would place in its hands the power to prevent any undertaking by North Western to meet competition by modernizing its operations in the light of technological development, and fulfilling its obligation of operating efficiently and economically for the benefit of itself, its employees, and the public. Ultimately the Union could even bring about a situation where the railroad itself might be forced out of business or so crippled financially that all employees, including the Union's members, would suffer. This contract proposal, if accepted, would" enable the Union to control the pace of North Western's compliance with the Commission orders aforesaid.
And in
The proposed contract change in the case before us represents an attempt to usurp legitimate managerial prerogative in the exercise of business judgment with respect to the most economical and efficient conduct of its operations. It is perhaps significant that on oral argument, counsel for the Union expressed the opinion that a demand for veto over discontinuing trains, while less reasonable than that proposed here, would constitute a bargainable issue under the Railway Labor Act.
[t]he fact that other carriers may have submitted to unlawful demands does not change the character of such demands. A carrier may not escape its obligations in bargaining them away. (1958) . There the Court held that the employer's insistence that provisions for a strike ballot and for recognition of the local rather than the international be written in the agreement amounted to a refuaal to bargain, since those matters were outside the scope of mandatory bargaining.
72Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (937), is the leading case holding that there is an enforceable duty to bargain under the Railway Labor Act. § § 9(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act make it an unfair labor practice for employers or unions to refuse to LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS Other union demands which might fall within the "other" dispute category are those concerning "the type of product to be produced, the location of plants, the installation of new machinery and equipment," ' and those which discriminate against groups of employees. 74 Demands relating to supervisory personnel (other than the "subordinate officials" specified in section one, Fifth) also may not require bargaining.73
It is not clear whether a union can insist on demands giving rise to jurisdictional disputes affecting the jobs of other groups of employees. General Committee of Adjustments v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas RR. 7 0 suggests that the federal courts have no jurisdiction over such matters because they are solely within the province of the NMB. 7 7 In that case, however, the NMB had mediated the challenged agreement, and the result might have been different if it had not participated. 7 s Otherwise, the holding seems inconsistent in principle with the cases cited above 79 "Perhaps of some significance is the fact that the M-K-T case was decided the same day (and the opinion written by the same Justice (Douglas)) as Switchmen's Union of North America v. NMB, 320 U.S. 297 (1943) , in which the Court held that no appeal may be taken from NMB certifications. The certification" of a union would seem to be different from the Board's mediation of an agreement, however, which was involved in the M-K-T case. Curiously, Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. Ry. Co., 339 U.S. 239 (i95o),.also denies relief, but on the ground that the adjustment board (rather than the NMB) has exclusive jurisdiction over jurisdictional disputes. In the Slocum case, however, the issue arose as a minor dispute involving a determination of the work covered in the labor agreements. As should be readily apparent from their form of organization, adjustment boards are not capable of dealing satisfactorily with disputes between a carrier and two different unions over the same matter. See Union R.R. Co. v Since the Railway Labor Act contains no procedures for the settlement of "other" disputes, the courts are primarily responsible for resolving the legal problems which may arise. The next section deals with the role of the courts under other provisions of the Railway Labor Act.
G. The Role of the Courts
The most obvious role of the courts concerns those matters for which jurisdiction is specifically conferred by the Railway Labor Act: penalties for noncompliance with provisions giving employees the right to organize without interference and prohibiting, carriers from unilaterally changing rates of pay, rules, or working conditions except as provided in the Act;"' enforcement of adjustment board awards; 82 and supervision of arbitration proceedings 8 3
Unlike the National Labor Relations Act, the Railway Labor Act authorizes no administrative body to undertake enforcement proceedings; the parties must com- (1952) . Although the conflict between the pilots and the flight engineers has been the most acute jurisdictional dispute during the past two years, jurisdictional disputes are a continuing general problem for the airlines. This section of the Act gives United States district courts jurisdiction in suits by employees to enforce adjustment board awards. (Carriers are not given a corollary right of enforcement.) In such actions, the findings and order of the adjustment board are "prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." § 3, First (m), however, makes such a determination "final and binding" upon the parties, "except insofar as [it] shall contain a money award." The Supreme Court has held that these provisions make an adjustment board award "final and binding" if a money claim of an employee is denied, but subject to judicial review if such a claim is granted. In Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Price, 37 CCH Lab. Cas. 65,559 (r959), Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, observed: "The disparity in judicial review of Adjustment Board orders, if it can be said to be unfair at all, was explicitly created by Congress, and it is for Congress to say whether it ought to be removed. 914 (1958) , the union alternatively took the position that a major dispute was involved. Although minor disputes may be processed through to a "final and binding" award, major disputes must ultimately be settled by agreement of the parties (or by voluntary arbitration). Injunctive relief in major disputes, therefore, goes only to preserving the stdtus quo during completion of statutory procedures and cooling-off periods, so that the parties may thereby be induced to agree without resorting to economic "self- (1959) , the question arose as to whether the court could preserve the status quo by restraining a strike in a major dispute only for the cooling-off period following the NMB's proffer of arbitration, or whether a new status quo period was started later when the Board had intervened in an emergency effort to avert a strike. The court held that the emergency mediation gave rise to a new status quo period. "It seems to me that courts in exercising their discretion in declaratory judgment cases ought to be particularly liberal where labor relations are involved. The most serious defect in the current trial-by-battle method of resolving disagreements between labor and management is that the method has no natural tendency to attain a reasonable result. The courts should welcome the opportunity to act in every case where, under the law, they can substitute a decision based on reason for one based upon the relative might of the contenders. sary preliminary to obtaining judicial relief. 4 Venue lies wherever the labor organization or carrier sued has a place of business."
The courts have asserted jurisdiction to prevent racial discrimination, even though the Railway Labor Act does not expressly confer jurisdiction or require a union not to discriminate." The theory of such relief is that the duty not to discriminate is implicit in the privileges which the Act confers upon unions 9 T and that the courts should assert jurisdiction because of the lack of an administrative remedy 8
The Supreme Court has not decided whether the rule in these cases applies to other than racial discrimination, 9 and the lower courts are divided on the question'
An exceedingly complex body of law has developed concerning adjustment board proceedings. The most challenging current problems have to do with (a) the extent to which union discrimination (racial or otherwise) is a basis for judicial review or reversal of adjustment board awards, 1 1 and (b) the availability of a state cause of ' o The doctrine was applied in Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 469 (D. Del. 1958) , as a basis for asserting jurisdiction to review the award of a system board of adjustment where the union action for damages as an alternative remedy.
1 2 Without attempting to discuss in detail these and related questions, it is enough to recognize that extreme complexity exists where there should be great simplicity, and consideration of amendatory legislation would appear to be warranted. As one exasperated judge remarked recently :103
Whereas the discharged employee should be guided by simple procedures geared to the sensitivities of his hardship, in reality he has been subjected to the rigors of a guessing game. The difficulty is that the decision of the Supreme Court in Moore and its holding in Koppal are, when served, barely digestible in the same system. Beyond that, it may be asked whether the law has removed itself from the arena of common sense by adopting in the upper reaches an unrealistic approach. To put the Socratic question, does the employee who has been discharged, being thus of an uneven mind-hounded by the realization of loss of job and support for his family for an indefinite period; overwhelmed by the bigness of Organization-Union, Carrier-seemingly, and even actually, banded against him; pressured by the increasing awareness he has so little time to act to seek job restoration; and induced by the thought the Adjustment Board is the quickest, and even sole, means of doing so-grasp for relief almost blindly ignorant in most cases of his legal position? In any event, if indeed, a choice must be made, is that the selective and measured act for which he is later to be judged and refused admittance in the court house door?
One other question of general interest is the extent to which the Railway Labor Act pre-empts substantive provisions of state law. Since the Railway Labor Act contains no schedule of unfair labor practices such as that contained in the National Labor Relations Act, 04 The agreement (which any certificated air carrier may join merely by signing and filing a copy with the CAB) obligates each party "to pay over to the party suffering [a] strike an amount equal to its increased revenues attributable to the strike during the term thereof, less applicable added direct expense." The struck party agrees "to provide the public with information concerning all air services rendered by the other parties, and to direct to them as much of the traffic normally carried by the party suffering such a strike as possible, all as the best interests of the members of the public may require. Otherwise the agreement was to terminate on October 2o, 1959, unless renewed."' After the agreement had been filed with the CAB, January 14, 1959 was set as the date for oral argument, and the carriers and unions were invited to participate. In so deciding, the Board did not make "any determination as to whether the agreement is a wise or beneficial step in the promotion of maximum harmony between labor and management, generally, or in air transportation in particular," since, as a statutory matter, its approval was required by "the lack of any affirmative showing that the agreement is adverse to the objectives specified by Congress."' 34 Deletion of the traffic-routing provision was required because the Board felt that the public should be advised of travel facilities on the basis of passenger convenience rather than carrier obligation and recognized that the provision "is not crucial to the purpose of the agreement."' '
CONCLUSIONS
The Railway Labor Act's major dispute procedures have not been successful in accomplishing their primary objective-i.e., the settlement of such disputes without strikes. Some students, in fact, believe that the present statutory procedures actually impede peaceful settlements. Whether that is true or not, the fact remains that labor disputes in the recent past have been accompanied by a number of serious airline strikes. The consequences of such strikes have been demonstrated, time and time again, to be gravely injurious to the public interest in the uninterrupted transportation by air of persons, property, and mail. By forcing a complete shutdown of operations, such strikes also commonly result in loss of pay by employees having different bargaining representatives and, therefore, not concerned in the dispute.
Aside from whatever fundamental changes should be made in the major dispute provisions of the Act, therefore, the public interest would seem to require at the '"I Id. at io. CAB, Oct. 19, 1959, P. 5, the Board denied a union petition for reconsideration of its approval of the mutual aid pact, stating: "The petition contains excerpts from the legislative history of the Railway Labor Act in an attempt to show that the intent of Congress was hostile to agreements such as the one before us. The congressional history, however, only confirms our original view that, in the Railway Labor Act, Congress restricted the ambit of its proscription against compulsion to governmental action, and left the parties free to engage in reciprocal tests of economic strength within the framework of collective bargaining."
Wall Street journal, Sept. 23, 1959, P. 2, reported the formation of a "coordinating committee for unions in the air transport industry" with a purpose of devising an answer to the mutual aid pact. A union spokesman suggested that contracts be arranged to expire at about the same time, "so we can have unified collective bargaining." The six unions involved are the Air Line Dispatchers Association, the Air Line Pilots Association, the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, the Flight Engineers International Association, the International Association of Machinists, and the Transport Workers Union. very least that the privilege of resorting to strike action be preceded by and conditioned on a secret strike ballot in which an absolute majority of the employees concerned reject (a) the carrier's last offer, (b) the NMB's proffer of arbitration, and (c) the recommendations of a presidential emergency board, if any. If any one of the three items listed above were not so rejected, the union involved should not be permitted to resort to economic warfare. It seems obvious that such an election should be conducted by a public agency after both sides-the union and management-have had a full opportunity to explain their positions to the employees.
Moreover, many who have had experience in the field-including this writerhave felt that strike action has been taken in some cases to accomplish objectives which are not wholly in accord with either a sound system of air transportation or the public interest. Jurisdictional and employee-qualification disputes fall into this category. Such disputes should be settled by an agency charged with protecting the public interest rather than by the pressures of collective bargaining or the balance of economic power.
A further area for correction, important from an operational point of view, is the harassment caused by threatened illegal strike action. When such threats are made, management must take them seriously and prepare for them, whether or not the unions mean them seriously. Operational uncertainty and cost result-particularly when, as is frequently the case, such threats occur over holiday travel periods and judges are not readily available to restrain them. Threats of illegal strike action certainly can be no less damaging than defamatory statements. Persons making libelous or slanderous statements have common-law liability for them, and it would not seem unreasonable to hold unions making threats of illegal strikes answerable in damages at the very least.
The minor-dispute procedures of the Railway Labor Act have been fairly successful in adjusting such disputes without resort to strike action, and the recent Chicago River case'" 6 should further strengthen those procedures. They are subject to abuse, however, and, where there is a will, there is a way to use them as an instrument of harassment. Moreover, they are unsuitable for disposing of jurisdictional disputes and troublesome problems where an individual grievance is asserted and the union itself is antagonistic to the claim. The role of the NMB is ambiguous. The Board has correctly recognized that its primary role is mediatory, and it is probably right that the performance of certain other functions-which, nevertheless, badly need to be performed-would interfere with its effectiveness in mediation. Functions which perhaps might be performed by a separate agency include settlement of jurisdictional disputes, bargaining-unit determinations, and the conduct of representation elections.
The Railway Labor Act has been in operation for a sufficient period of time to warrant legislative review in the light of experience under it. The clamor accom-138 See supra note 90.
